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Abstract
Korean industries have been targets of complaints involving charges of unfair subsidies on steel and
chemical products by the Korean government filed in the USA and the EU, Korea’s two largest trading
partners. A recent addition to these series of complaints is the complaint filed with the EU Commission
against DRAM Industry in Korea, a Korean shipbuilding industry. These “countervailing duties”
complaints, however, helped Korea identify and modify its problematic practices.
Although subsidies and countervailing duties are less frequently used than are anti-dumping duties, their
coverage spans over, inter alia, the industrial policies, and the tax system of each country, wielding
significant influence thereupon. In particular, restructuring issues have an impact on the economy and the
society at large and therefore should not be neglected.
This paper will first offer an explanation of the ASCM and a review of operation of the current system and
other general matters, and then will discuss a few cases that have identified potential flaws in the current
system. Finally it will examine the DDA scene to anticipate possible future developments and propose
certain means of preparation.

With the birth of the WTO in January 1995, the “Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures” (“ASCM”) came into effect, becoming the international set
of rules regulating government subsidies.  Since then, the ASCM and the “Agreement
on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994” (“ADA,” also known as Anti-
Dumping Agreement) have been used as primary sources of remedial measures against
unfair trade practices. Such agreements were recently included in the agenda of the
WTO New Round, subjecting them to numerous rounds of negotiations to address
certain perceived imperfections that have led to considerable debate and controversy
throughout their implementation.
Korean industries have been targets of complaints involving charges of unfair
subsidies on steel and chemical products by the Korean government filed in the USA
and the EU, Korea’s two largest trading partners. A recent addition to these series of
complaints is the complaint filed with the EU Commission against DRAM Industry in
Korea, a Korean shipbuilding industry. These “countervailing duties” complaints,
however, helped Korea identify and modify its problematic practices.
Although subsidies and countervailing duties are less frequently used than are anti-
dumping duties, their coverage spans over, inter alia, the industrial policies, and the tax
system of each country, wielding significant influence thereupon. In particular,
restructuring issues have an impact on the economy and the society at large and
therefore should not be neglected.
This paper will first offer an explanation of the ASCM and a review of operation of
the current system and other general matters, and then will discuss a few cases that
have identified potential flaws in the current system.  Finally it will examine the DDA
scene to anticipate possible future developments and propose certain means of
preparation.
I.  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
A. Overview of ASCM 
Under the WTO regime, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties and safeguard
measures are recognized as the remedies against damages to the domestic industry
caused by unfair trade practices. The term “countervailing duty” in this context means
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a special customs duty levied by the importing country whose domestic industry is
injured due to a subsidized product. The purpose of such duty is offset the subsidy
bestowed upon the industry or the individual manufacturers producing such product.
Before the establishment of the WTO, subsidies had been regulated by Articles 6
and 16 of the GATT and by the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties adopted
at the Tokyo Round in 1979. Such regulations, however, did not prove effective
primarily because the definition of a subsidy was too inclusive and ambiguous and no
definite criteria were proposed with regard to countervailing measures. To make
matters worse, the applicability of the agreements reached in the Tokyo Round was
limited to 24 Members only.
To overcome these constraints and improve on the outcome of the Tokyo Round
and GATT, numerous discussions were held during the Uruguay Round, resulting in
the establishment of the ASCM at the time of the launch of the WTO. In contrast to the
Tokyo Round, the ASCM offered a more explicit definition of subsidy, classified
subsidies into “prohibited” subsidies, “actionable” subsidies and “non-actionable”
subsidies by their nature, and introduced the concept of “specificity.”  
Recently adopted at the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha, Qatar in
2001, paragraph 28 of the Doha Declaration calls for a negotiation aimed at clarifying
and improving the regulations under the ASCM.
B. Subsidy
1. Definition of “subsidy” 
A subsidy means a “benefit” conferred on an exporter or a producer through a
financial contribution made by a government or any public body. Under Article 1 of
the ASCM, a subsidy exists when there is financial contribution or any form of income
or price support by a government and conferring a benefit on an exporter or a producer
through.  
Article 1 of the ASCM classifies financial contribution into 4 categories: (i) a direct
transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion) and potential direct transfers
of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees), (ii) government revenue that is otherwise
due being foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits), (iii)
provision of goods or services other than general infrastructure, and (iv) purchase of
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goods. Additionally, the definition of the scope of governments and public bodies
given in the ASCM categorizes a private body as a government or a public body if
such body is entrusted or directed by the government to carry out a financial
contribution. Subsidies granted by a private body have led to controversies as to
whether the entrustment or direction by the government exists in such context.1)
Article 14 of the ASCM deems that a benefit exists in any of the following cases:
(i) if the government provides equity capital and the investment decision is inconsistent
with the usual investment practice of private investors within the territory of the
country; (ii) if the government extends a loan and there is a difference between the
amount that the firm receiving the loan pays on the government loan and the amount
the firm would pay on a comparable commercial loan which the firm could actually
obtain in the market; (iii) if the government offers a loan guarantee and there is a
difference between the amount that the firm receiving the guarantee pays on a loan
guaranteed by the government and the amount that the firm would pay on a
comparable commercial loan absent the government guarantee; or (iv) if the
government provides goods or services or purchases goods and the provision is made
for less than adequate remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than adequate
remuneration. The adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to the
prevailing domestic market conditions.
In general, a benefit is deemed to exist if there would be a difference had there been
no intervention by the state or a public body. This test is used in determining the
amount of a subsidy and the countervailing duty rate. Although the concept of finding
the difference between the subsidized goods and the comparable goods under normal
market conditions does seem logically correct, in practical application, it is not so
trivial to pinpoint the comparable conditions that exactly fit into each case. On this
account, comparable goods are selected in broad perspective, utilizing the market
interest rate, yield to maturity, et al.2)
1) With respect to the countervailing duties cases involving Korean industries, the question of the government
control over Korean financial institutions has been emerging as the single most important issue in virtually all
investigations, which will be further discussed below.
2) In Korean cases, the 3-year bond yield is used with respect to bond issues, and the annual average offered rate
by the Bank of Korea is used with respect to loans.
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B. Types of Subsidies
The above subsidies are categorized by type into: (i) prohibited subsidies, (ii)
actionable subsidies and (iii) non-actionable subsidies.
Prohibited subsidies under Article 3 include the subsidies contingent upon export
performance (export subsidies) and the subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic
over imported goods (import substitution subsidies). The ASCM lists specific cases of
export subsidies in Annex I thereto.
Actionable subsidies and non-actionable subsidies are classified by whether the
subsidy, as defined in the above Paragraph (1), causes adverse effects to the domestic
industry of the importing country and whether the subsidy is “specific.” Adverse
effects are deemed to exist when there is (i) injury to the domestic industry of the
importing country, (ii) nullification/impairment of the benefits of another Member
country accruing under GATT, or (iii) serious prejudice to another Member country. A
Member country which determines that subsidized import has caused “material injury”
to its domestic industry, may impose countervailing measures, pursuant to
investigating initiated and conducted in accordance with Part V (Articles 10 to 23) of
the ASCM.
Notwithstanding the above criteria, however, a few exceptions recognized by the
ASCM, i.e. assistance for research activities, assistance to disadvantaged regions, and
assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental
requirements imposed by law and/or regulations are classified as non-actionable
subsidies if such assistance meets the prescribed requirements.3) These non-actionable
subsidies and any annual changes therein, however, must be reported to the WTO
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
C. Injury
The ASCM refers to the ADA with respect to quite a good portion of the
procedures required therein, among others. The definitions and criteria of the injury to
the domestic industry caused by subsidies are  quoted mostly from the ADA.  
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D. Specificity
As mentioned above, initiation of countervailing measures requires that the subsidy
be specific to a certain enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries
(hereinafter referred to as “certain enterprises”).
Article 2.1 first determines specificity by whether a subsidy is limited to certain
enterprises, by whether objective criteria governing the eligibility for the subsidy are
established, and by other express and prima facie statutory requirements.
Notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity, specificity may be established in
the following circumstances:
( i ) the subsidy is in fact provided for certain enterprises only; 
(ii) the subsidy is predominantly used by certain enterprises; 
(iii) disproportionately large amounts of the subsidy are granted to certain
enterprises; or
(iv) the granting authority exercises discretion in the decision to grant the subsidy.
In other words, specificity can be classified into de jure specificity and de facto
specificity. As the investigating authority’s discretion plays a larger role in determining
specificity, different authorities take different stances on the same program. In
particular, to determine de facto specificity, the investigating authority of each country
considers the size or quantity of certain enterprises, predominant use of the subsidy by
certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to
certain enterprises and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the
granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy, et al. However, the ambiguity in
determination of “predominance” and other criteria result in different decisions on the
same issue.4)
3) Please refer to Article 8.2 of the SCM Agreement.
4) Although it is reasonable to deem that certain clauses of the Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act of
Korea that are applicable to the manufacturing industry involve no specificity, especially given the multitude of the
entities encompassed in the manufacturing industry, yet the EU Commission decided that limiting the line of business
to the manufacturing industry did give rise to specificity. On the same issue, however, the US Dept. of Commerce
found that specificity did not exist, especially in view of the weight carried by the manufacturing industry in the overall
economy of Korea.
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E. Operation of ASCM
Each Member of the WTO must, as in the case of the ADA, provide the WTO with
notifications regarding its domestic regulation on subsidies and countervailing duties
and annual updates of operation thereof. In addition, each Member is required to notify
annually to the WTO of any non-actionable subsidy programs that are recognized
under the ASCM and operated in its territory and any annual changes therein.
Any disputes on subsidies between Members are to be resolved through mutual
consultations and then the WTO dispute settlement procedures, as illustrated in the
dispute settlement procedural flowchart below.
II. Analysis of Recent Cases and Identification of Problems
The current ASCM as entered into in 1995 has since been steadily used by quite a
few countries as the favorite means of remedy, together with anti-dumping measures,
against unfair trade practices. Against Korean industries, 11 subsidy complaints have
been raised between 1995 and 2001, which is the second only behind the 25 cases
lodged against India during the same period. 
The following is the dispute settlement procedural flowchart:
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WTO Dispute Settlement Procedural Flowchart
Member requesting consultations Request for consultations Member responding
Reply within 10 days
<Consultation Phase>
Entry into Consultations (within 30 days of the request)
WTO Director-General may
offer good offices, conciliation
or mediation.
<Panel Phase> Request for establishment of apanel
(if unable to reach a settlement




Establishment of a Dispute
Settlement Panel
(to be established at the 2nd
DSB meeting following unless
at the 1st meeting the DSB
decides by consensus not to
establish a panel)
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Composition of panelists
(to be appointed by the
Director-General if there is no
agreement on the panelists
within 20 days after the
establishment of a panel)
Expert review group
Review by the panel (by
contacting the concerned
Members and the 3rd parties)
An interim report submitted by
the panel to the concerned
parties
Circulation of the final report
to the Members
(within 6 to 7 months after the
appointment of the panelists)
(If appealed) (If not appealed)
<DSB Phase> <Appellate Body Phase>
Adoption of the panel report
by the DSB
(within 60 days after the date
of circulation of the report)
Decision by the Appellate
Body
(within 60 days or in any case
within 90 days after the
notification of the intention to
appeal)
Adoption of the appellate body













authorized by the DSB
(within 60 days after the
expiry of the reasonable period
of time)
5) A total of 11 subsidy complaints were filed against Korean products until 2001: 5 cases by the US and another 5
by the EU.
Many of the complaints against Korea have been filed by the EU and the US steel
industries.5) The investigations conducted by the EU, however, have been terminated
mostly due to nonexistence of injury. For this reason, we will discuss below the major
issues of the complaints filed against the Korean steel manufacturers, how Korean
industry reacted upon the cases and the decisions rendered by the US Department of
Commerce.
A. Korean Cases
As mentioned earlier, subsidy complaints against Korean products have steadily
been lodged, mostly in the US and the EU, since the 1990’s. The major issues include
Korean government’s control over financial institutions, long-term Won or foreign
currency denominated loans, and the clauses regarding the inclusion of reserves in
deductible expenses, tax credit, abatement and exemption of the tax amount under the
Restriction of Preferential Taxation Act (formerly known as the Restriction of Tax
Relief Act), and the financial and taxation privileges granted to promote corporate
restructuring during the Asian financial crisis. Power rates and port facilities were also
raised as subsidy in several cases.
1. Korean Government’s Control over Financial Institutions
The issue of the Korean government’s control over the financial institutions has
been a constant source of complaint and has led to investigations by the US
Department of Commerce against Korean steel products.
Since the Korean War in 1950, the Korean government has actively intervened in
the Korean financial system to direct what limited financial resources the country had
to effectively develop key industries. For instance, the priority placed with the
chemical and heavy industries between the 1970’s to 1980’s facilitated access to
financial resources and favorable interest or borrowing rates by manufacturers in such
industries. 
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As the Korean economy reached a certain level of maturity in the late 1980’s
through the early 1990’s, its economic development policies gradually evolved and
resulted in the financial system moving closer to a self-regulating, efficient market
model.
The Korean government implemented a four-phase interest rate liberalization
program in 1991 that encouraged each Korean bank to set its own interest rates. It also
amended the laws regarding outside directors and the appointment of the heads of
financial institutions so that Korean banks might overcome inherent limitation of the
“ownerless bank” and exercise autonomy in their individual marketing activities.
Over the course of the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and in the
aftermath, the Korean financial system, in full compliance with the IMF
recommendations, came to completely do away with the government control through,
inter alia, the establishment of an integrated financial supervisory body and abolition
of the regulations limiting interest rates, etc., most of which were informed by and
adopted from the financial systems of developed countries’, especially the financial
system of the U.S.
a) American Standpoint
In the determination rendered by the US Department of Commerce subsidy
investigation against Korean steel products in 1993, the Department evaluated the
Korean financial system as of both prior to and after 1991, and reached the same
conclusion for both periods: that the Korean financial system was under the direct and
indirect influence of the government, which was demonstrated by the appointment of
the head of each bank by the government, the government intervention in
determination of interest rates by the banks and the government’s support for specific
industries in accordance with the planned economic objectives such as the above-
mentioned heavy and chemical industry drive.
Although the US Department of Commerce investigated the changes that occurred
after 1993 in the Korean financial system on a few more occasions, such as an
investigation against Korean stainless plates in 1997 and the recent investigation
against the Korean cold-rolled steel products that resulted in a final determination in
October 2001, the Department maintained that the Korean financial institutions
remained under the government influence despite the numerous reforms made
Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2003
65
throughout the 1990’s,6) due to, in particular, an increase in the government stakes in
the major commercial banks resulting from the public fund infusion through financial
restructuring processes.
b) Korean Counteraction
Over the course of the subsidy and countervailing duty disputes with the US, the
Korean government has steadily focused on explaining the above-mentioned changes
in the financial system and stressing the definite changes that have been made from the
early 1990’s to the present.
Particularly, Korea explained the inevitability of the expanded government stakes
in commercial banks that occurred in the course of the financial restructuring, and
underlined the intrinsic difference between such government stakes and general
investments made for the purposes of the managerial control or capital gains. The
Korean government has laid further emphasis on the irrelevance of the expanded
stakes to the government control over the financial institutions by presenting
management normalization agreements and other various agreements with investment
banks and mentioning that the government has declared a non-intervention doctrine
with regard to daily businesses of banks, among others.
2.. Corporate Restructuring
To overcome the Asian financial crisis of 1997, a large number of enterprises
struggled to rehabilite through court receivership, composition or workout. In support
of such efforts, full or partial exemption of debts, debt rescheduling, debt-to-equity
swaps and other similar measures were taken. Debates about whether subsidies exist
by nature in the financial and/or taxation support for certain enterprises with respect to
these series of restructuring cases continue today. Regarding this issue, the US already
examined the existence of a subsidy in its investigation into companies under workout
in the structural steel beam case and the STS C/R case. Apart from these
6) Federal Register / Vol. 67. No. 32, “Notice of Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and
Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination: Certain Cold-
rolled Steel Products from the Republic of Korea.”
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investigations, the EU Commission investigated the workout program for Daewoo
Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering in the TBR shipbuilding case and is currently
conducting a countervailing duty and subsidy investigation into Hynix Semiconductor,
which is under restructuring program in accordance with the Corporate Restructuring
Promotion Act.
During the process of the subsidy investigation into the workout program for
Kangwon Industry in the structural steel beam case, the US separated its
determinations on the nature of the workout program at large and the specific workout
program implemented for Kangwon Industry. The US Department of Commerce
determined that the workout program per se is not a program that grants any subsidies
and accepted the assertions of the Korean government that the Korean workout
program had been adopted on financial institution’s own initiative by applying the
London approach, and no limitation was placed on the selection of the subject
companies. The US Department of Commerce, however, divided the specific workout
program for Kangwon Industry into three subsections, determining that a subsidy
existed within the extent of the subsection regarding the rescheduling and reduction of
interests of the long-term loans, since the Department has already held that long-term
loans to the steel industry had been subsidies.7)
Meanwhile, the EU Commission holds a different viewpoint from that of the US
regarding this issue. The EU Commission determined that a subsidy existed in the
workout program for Daewoo Shipbuilding in its TBR investigation report against the
Korean shipbuilding industry. First, in rebuttal to the Korean assertion that workout
programs were operated on financial institution’s own initiative, the Commission
pointed out that participant institutions were largely government-owned, or the
initiative of operation of the programs had been taken by the institutions under the
government influence. Second, as opposed to the assertion that no limitation was
placed on selection of the subject companies, the EU Commission determined that the
workout program was basically established for the purpose of restructuring 6 to 64
largest conglomerates, placing inherent limitations to its operation.
The assertions of the EU Commission add that the form of the workout program
7) Federal Register Vol. 64, “ Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final
Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination: Structural Steel Beams from the
Republic of Korea”.
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itself manifests the financial institutions’ own initiative, yet the program is mostly
operated by public financial institutions such as the Korea Development Bank and
private institutions having financial problems, and these financial institutions are
unlikely to make the kind of decisions that go against the government interest, given
that they rely on the government for their survival.8)
These determinations made by the EU Commission clearly demonstrate that it
holds different perspectives on the normal business activities of commercial banks and
on their participation in the workout or other restructuring programs for troubled
enterprises.
In addition, the EU Commission does not bother to consider the scope of the
industries that are actually subject to the program and goes on to recognize the
existence of specificity merely because the subject companies are listed, while in fact
the selection of the appropriate program among self-regulated corporate restructuring,
workout schemes, etc. was made on basis of the economic scale of individual
enterprises for the sake of efficiency. This further exhibits that the determination of
specificity currently relies too much on the arbitrary volition of each investigating
authority.
3. Taxation
The Korean government renders taxation support to enterprises under the clauses
regarding inclusion of reserves in deductible expenses, tax credit, abatement and
exemption of the tax amount under the Restriction of Preferential Taxation Act
(formerly known as the Restriction of Tax Relief Act).
a) Export Loss Reserve
The export loss reserve makes it possible that a certain portion of the export income
is counted toward a reserve and included in the expense in preparation for a potential
future loss from export. Such amount is later set off against the loss if the loss does
8) Report to the Trade Barriers Regulation Committee: Examination procedure concerning an obstacle to trade.,
within the meaning of council regulation (EC) No 3286/94, consisting of trade practices maintained by Korea affecting
trade in commercial vessel.
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occurs in the future or is included back into income.
The US Department of Commerce asserted that this program allowed Korean
exporters a grace of tax payment for the entire period prior to the offset or inclusion in
income, since they might include a future loss in the current expense. For this reason,
the US Department of Commerce determined that such deferred tax payment
constitutes a subsidy contingent upon export performance under the ASCM.
The Korean government examined whether this program fell under the prohibited
subsidies under the WTO agreement and determined that it constituted export subsidy
thereunder. Therefore, Korea abolished the export loss reserve in the amendment to the
Restriction of Preferential Taxation Act in 1998.
b. Foreign Market Development Reserve
The foreign market development reserve was devised to support exporters’ effort to
develop new markets. The US Department of Commerce determined that this program
also constituted a prohibited subsidy under the WTO agreement, applying the same
logic as with the case of the export loss reserve.
The Korean government acknowledged that the program constituted a prohibited
subsidy under the WTO agreement, resulting in the abolition of the same amendment
of the Restriction of Preferential Taxation Act in 1998.
c. Investment Tax Credit
This program was adopted to promote and support fixed investments by enterprises
by deducting a certain portion of the investments in the new plant and equipment from
the tax amount.
The US Department of Commerce asserted that this program fell under a subsidy
contingent on the use of domestic goods over imported goods under the ASCM, since
the program allowed more deductions for investments in domestically-produced
equipment than in imported equipment.
The US Department of Commerce’s assertion led the Korean government to review
the compliance of the program with the WTO agreement, and concluded that it may
fall under the import substitution subsidy. As a result, Korea amended the Restriction
of Preferential Taxation Act in 1998 in such a way to level the applicable deductions
for both domestically-produced equipment and imported equipment.
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d. Miscellaneous
As mentioned above, the US Department of Commerce and the EU Commission
have steadily been asking the Korean government about the existence of prohibited
subsidies and specificity of subject companies with respect to the education and human
resource development tax deduction, the investment tax credit after the amendment in
1998, various taxation issues related to research and development, and other programs
under the Restriction of Preferential Taxation Act and the former Restriction of Tax
Relief Act.
Most of the time, the primary issues are centered around the issue of specificity.
The Korean government has been asserting the nonexistence of specificity, either de
jure or de facto, in the application of the miscellaneous programs by providing the US
Department of Commerce and the EU Commission with the text of the laws and the
application case analysis. Meanwhile, the Korean government has been reviewing the
determinations made by the US Department of Commerce and other authorities and
improving regulations to avoid unnecessary controversies.
III. Recent Trends in Discussions Related to ASCM
A. Background Discussions; Problems of ASCM
As each Member accumulates experience under the ASCM and more and more
cases are resolved through the system, the limitations and the problems of the current
ASCM system have been exposed.
Although countervailing complaints have been filed with relatively less frequency
than the anti-dumping complaints,9) countervailing complaints have nevertheless been
abused as a remedy against unfair trade practices.
11 countervailing duty complaints were filed against Korean products primarily by
the US and EU industries for the period between January 1, 1995 and December 31,
2001. For the same period, only three cases resulted in the actual imposition of
9) A WTO report states that 1845 A/D complaints were filed from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2001 while
only 143 CVD complaints were instituted for the same period.
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countervailing duties, which is a fairly limited number even with the assumption that
the cases initiated in 2000 and 2001 had not produced any results within the same
period.10) Although the actions taken by the Korean government and exporters did
contribute to the high percentage of dismissed complaints, the results also imply that
the domestic industry of the importing Member customarily adds a countervailing duty
complaint at the time of filing an anti-dumping complaint, based on past
determinations without taking the steps to investigate to establish sufficient evidence in
advance.
Such indiscriminate filing of complaints by the domestic industry of the importing
Member and the initiation of investigations by the government of the importing
Member only after the review of such insufficient evidence, only serve to place
unnecessary constraints upon the Korean government and the exporters, filing of
which is arguably another form of a trade-barrier.
B. Doha Development Agenda
Although Korea, Japan, the EU and virtually all other Members argued that
negotiations be opened to prevent the abuse of anti-dumping and countervailing duty
complaints by improving the ADA and the ASCM, such effort had been thwarted by
the persistent US opposition until 2001, when a change in the US congressional stance
resulted in an acceptance by the US of the improvement of the agreements on the
condition of limiting the agenda and thus the Doha Ministerial Declaration came to
include an agreement on initiation of such negotiations.
In Article 28 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration dated November 14, 2002, the
Members agreed to initiate the negotiations for the subsidy matter, while preserving the
basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of the ASCM and its instruments and
objectives.11)
10) Please refer to “the statistics on subsidies and countervailing measure” on WTO website (www.wto.org).
11) Doha Ministerial Declaration 
Article 28. In the light of experience and of the increasing application of these instruments by members, we agree
to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines under the Agreements on Implementation of Article VI of
the GATT 1994 and on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, while preserving the basic concepts, principles and
effectiveness of these Agreements and their instruments and objectives, and taking into account the needs of developing
and least-developed participants. In the initial phase of the negotiations, participants will indicate the provisions,
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The agenda of the negotiations focused on clarification and improvement of the
disciplines and procedures regarding subsidies and countervailing measures under the
current WTO regulations, while taking into account the necessity of subsidies arising
from the economic situations surrounding developing and underdeveloped countries.
In particular, much attention was paid to the fisheries subsidies, given the
extraordinary importance of such industry to developing countries.
Thus, the forthcoming negotiations for the improvement of the current ASCM are
expected to produce clarification on specificity, which has been the source of much
controversy. Additionally, the decision to consider the necessity of subsidies for
developing and underdeveloped countries during the negotiations leaves room for due
regard to the interest of developing and underdeveloped countries, whereas the ASCM
has been criticized for protecting the interest of developed countries only, an inherited
characteristic borne out of its legacy with the OECD, which was an exclusive club for
developed-countries in 1950. On November 13, 2001, the WTO SCM Committee
decided to extend the developing country clause in Article 27.4 of the current ASCM
until 2007, which is widely viewed as a legitimate consideration for the benefit of the
developing countries.12)
1. Progress of DDA13)
As expressed in Article 28 of the Declaration, the initial phase of the negotiations
regarding subsidies is focused on identification of trade distorting practices and the
current clauses in need of clarification or improvement.
In March 2002, the first official meeting of the Negotiating Group on Rules was
including disciplines on trade distorting practices, that they seek to clarify and improve in the subsequent phase. In the
context of these negotiations, participants shall also aim to clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies,
taking into account the importance of this sector to developing countries. We note that fisheries subsidies are also
referred to in paragraph 31.
Article 29. We also agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures under the
existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements. The negotiations shall take into account the
developmental aspects of regional trade agreements.
12) WTO G/SCM/With471/Rev. 113 November 2001, “Proposed Procedures for Extensions under Article 27.4
for Certain Developing Country Members”.
13) Paraphrased from Recent Trend in DDA Subsidy Negotiations written by Kang, Moon Song
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held, where there was a general discussion on appointment of the chairman and
operational suggestions. In the second meeting of the Group, there was discussion on
export credit, reinstatement of the provisions on non-actionable subsidies and serious
prejudice, more preferential treatment of developing countries, among others, which
were brought up by Brazil, Canada and India. Each of these countries presented
unfairness issues and suggestion on possible improvement measures for the current
agreements, based on the complaints filed so far.
2. Propositions Made
a) Brazil
With respect to export credit, Brazil asserts that the provisions of Annex I (1) and
(2) of the current ASCM fail to reflect the differences between developed countries
and developing countries, which may result in a disadvantageous application to
developing countries. Brazil argues that, in particular, the provisions that presumes that
the compliance with the OECD guidelines automatically warrants the nonexistence of
subsidies are disadvantageous to the WTO Members that are not OECD members.
b) Canada
Canada argues for a clarification of certain ambiguous provisions that may give rise
to disputes and for the reinstatement of the non-actionable subsidy clause, which
expired at the end of 1999. The specific arguments are as follows:
•Clarification of the export subsidy clause
•Reinstatement of the non-actionable subsidy clause in Article 6.1
•R&D subsidy, regional development subsidy, environmental subsidy and other
non-actionable subsidies under Article 8
•Authorized remedies under Article 9
The above clauses were provided for a limited period of time of 5 years ending on
December 31, 1999, under Article 31.
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c) India
India argues for the strengthening of Article 27, which contains a special clause to
the benefit the developing countries, on the ground that subsidy and countervailing
measure duties imposed against the exports of a developing country would cause a
significant amount of social and economic problems due to the labor-intensiveness of
the export industry of such country, and that a developing country is more prone to
significant financial costs, insufficiency of the infrastructure, inadequate information
environment and other adverse conditions than faced by a developed country.
• Extension of a grace period for the application of export subsidies under Article
27.3
•Raising of the negligible imports criteria under Article 27.10
Raising of the de minimis criteria under Article 27.11
C. Future Prospects and Likely Influence on the Korean Economy
As widely known, the core issues of the Doha Development Agenda is the
negotiations regarding services and agricultural products. Due to the strong opposition
by the US and the limits placed on the agenda thereby, the ADA and the ASCM are
not expected to be core issues among the entire DDA negotiations. Especially, since it
was agreed that the current frame of the agreements would be maintained throughout
the negotiations, no major changes in the current agreements are expected.
As mentioned earlier, however, these agreements might be amended in such ways
to actively recognize the needs of the developing countries, given that the recent trend
has been towards a more flexible approach to the economic growth of developing and
underdeveloped countries. The developed countries might also seek to gather support
for the New Round by developing countries. Thus, the negotiations will likely be
steered towards the compromise between fair trade, the objective of the ASCM, and
economic development, the needs of the developing countries.
However, since little difference exists among the stance of each country on the
framework of the current ASCM, the framework is not expected to emerge as a major
issue in the course of forthcoming multilateral negotiations. Still, negotiations will be
centered around clarification of “specificity” and other terminology, export credit in
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developing countries, non-actionable subsidies, et al.
The subsidy problem may have a fatal impact upon a company struggling for
survival due to specificity in restructuring and the resultant countervailing duty
measures taken by the competing country if not properly addressed by a country such
as Korea, which had to survive the traumatic ordeal of financial and corporate
restructuring during the Asian financial crisis. The significance of the subsidy problem
is not any less than that of agriculture or the service industry, especially when
countervailing measure complaints converge on the steel, chemical products, and
shipbuilding, which all have material influence on the Korean economy.
In the meantime, the provisions granting a preferential treatment to developing
countries may be enhanced to the point of deforming the framework of fair trade by
the US and certain developed countries to gain support of developing and
underdeveloped countries with regard to other aspects. The unfair trade practices
allowed to developing countries may create a trading environment that is unfavorable
to Korea, which is, more often than not, in direct competition with developing
countries.
IV.  Conclusion
Under the current ASCM, Korean industries have been suffering significant
damages due to the abuse of countervailing duty investigations, illustrated by 11
complaints, currently ranked at 2nd place. Korea has therefore been actively seeking to
improve the ASCM as well as the ADA so as to prevent abuse of complaints resulting
from the ambiguity of the terminology and avert economic loss caused thereby.
In the coming days, the Korean government should argue for clarification and
stringent application of the provisions so as to prevent unnecessary trade disputes that
have occurred due to the ambiguity and arbitrary interpretation of “specificity” and
other terminology by competing industries. Furthermore, enhancement of the
preferential provisions for developing countries, which are in competition with Korea,
should be kept to a minimal, since it would otherwise wield adverse impact on the
Korean economy.
In addition, Korea must analyze various industrial assistance programs, which have
been the source of complications, and correct any problematic components that may
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cause trade friction, by implementing such corrections in the regulations. In particular,
any aspects that have a huge influence on the state economy such as the financial
assistance and tax breaks related to corporate restructuring, such as in the case of
Hynix and Daewoo Shipbuilding, does deserve more deliberate attention in devising
and implementing the relevant regulations.
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